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STRUCTURAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
BLAKE HUDSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The phrase “environmental constitutionalism” may have a number of
distinct meanings in different contexts.1 For the purpose of this symposium,
environmental constitutionalism is framed as addressing the question of how
constitutional provisions impact environmental quality and the environmental
rights of citizens.
Importantly, this conception of environmental
constitutionalism comes in at least two forms. The first, and more typical
conception, might be termed fundamental environmental constitutionalism—the
primary form highlighted in this symposium. Fundamental environmental
constitutionalism often involves textual constitutional provisions protecting
fundamental substantive or procedural citizen rights to a quality environment
in national or subnational instruments. Sometimes these textual provisions
create new constitutional rights. At other times, these provisions may codify
common law principles of public rights to environmental health, as do the
provisions of some state constitutions in the United States that reify public
trust rights in water, air, wildlife, or other resources.2 For instance, consider
the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Environmental Rights Amendment, at issue in
the recent Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania3 case:
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall
conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.4

* Professor of Law, Joint Appointment. LSU Law Center and LSU School of the Coast and
Environment. I would like to thank the participants in the Global Environmental
Constitutionalism symposium at Widener University School of Law for including me in the
conference and for their feedback on this article (though analysis expressed in the article is my
own). I would also like to thank the Widener Law Review for their hard work in preparing the
article for publication.
1 See Brian J. Gareau, Foreword: Global Environmental Constitutionalism, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 403, 403-04 (2013); Louis J. Kotzé, Arguing Global Environmental Constitutionalism, 1
TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 199, 203-04 (2012); Douglas A. Kysar, Global Environmental
Constitutionalism: Getting There from Here, 1 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 83, 90 (2012).
2 See generally M ICHAEL B LUMM & M ARY C HRISTINA W OOD , T HE P UBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE I N ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL RESOURCES LAW (2013).
3 Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
4 Id. at 913 (citing PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (commonly known as the “Environmental Rights
Amendment”)).
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A second form of environmental constitutionalism is equally important to
the exercise of national and subnational environmental protection measures
across the globe—that is, structural environmental constitutionalism, which is
the allocation of environmental regulatory authority across levels of
government within particular nations.
Structural environmental
constitutionalism is particularly relevant in federal systems of government.
Some federal nations constitutionally divide regulatory authority over certain
environmental subject matter between national (federal) and subnational
(state/provincial and local) governments. This can create a number of
constraints on environmental regulatory efforts at each level of government.5
For example, subnational governments may constrain national environmental
efforts by claiming that a regulatory realm is constitutionally reserved to the
states, and is therefore legally protected from federal interference.6 On the
other hand, national governments may preempt potentially efficacious state or
local environmental regulatory efforts pursuant to claimed exclusive
constitutional powers.7
Importantly, structural constraints on environmental policymaking do not
only arise out of national constitutions. The same dynamic may take place
within subnational jurisdictions if state or provincial constitutions limit local
government efforts to create innovative environmental policies. This may
occur if state or provincial governments fail to constitutionally empower local
governments to regulate in certain environmental areas, take back powers
previously granted to local governments to do so, or legislatively preempt local
government environmental regulatory efforts.8 Ultimately, constitutional
design related to regulatory authority within national and subnational
jurisdictions can be a structural form of environmental constitutionalism that
may have as much, or more, impact than the protection of fundamental
environmental rights within constitutional text.
The regulatory divide across levels of government in federal nations may
arise from explicit environmental constitutional text or, in its absence,
implicitly from constitutional interpretation undertaken by the judiciary. It
may also arise, of course, via legislative preemption of lower levels of
government pursuant to other constitutional powers that are not explicitly of
an environmental nature. I have previously highlighted these dynamics in the
context of forest policy9 and land use planning10 in a number of federal
There are a number of additional scenarios in which this can play out. See Blake Hudson &
Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to Commons Problems: Nested Governance Commons and
Climate Change, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1292-1312 (2013).
6 See id. at 1279. Contrast this with subnational governments in unitary systems, which may
not legally constrain environmental protection measures undertaken by the national
government, even though political subdivisions in unitary systems may apply political pressure
to shape national environmental policies or may be free to craft their own policies at the
allowance of the national government.
7 Id. at 1304.
8 See id. at 1308-09.
9 See generally Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests and Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees,
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363 (2011) [hereinafter Hudson, Climate Change, Forests and Federalism]; Blake
5
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nations, concluding that certain constitutional designs in federal nations can
negatively impact natural capital management across scales—that is—from
local to global scales of governance.11 For example, state and provincial
governments currently maintain virtually exclusive constitutional regulatory
authority over subnationally controlled forests in the United States and Canada
(which make up sixty-five and eighty-four percent of each nation’s forests,
respectively).12 This can pose serious complications for national level forest
policies that seek to harness subnational forests to combat climate change as
land development activities in both countries are expected to reduce forest
cover over the next several decades.13 Such forms of constitutional design can
also complicate international agreements, as the federal governments in these
nations may be unable to obligate subnational governments to certain potential
requirements of global agreements related to forests.14
This Article introduces this structural, but arguably less obvious, form of
environmental constitutionalism by detailing its relationship with fundamental
environmental constitutional textual provisions, and by describing some of the
environmental ramifications of constitutional designs that do not optimally
allocate regulatory authority across scales of government. Part II details how
both fundamental and structural environmental constitutionalism may be
contained in explicit constitutional text. Part II further analyzes how both the
likelihood of achieving textual changes within constitutions and the efficacy of
such changes depend upon the type of governmental system involved (federal
versus unitary), the level of government where textual changes are sought
(national versus state constitutions), and the type of environmental
constitutionalism sought to be achieved (fundamental versus structural). Part
III discusses how structural constitutionalism, in particular, is also embodied
within judicial interpretation of other constitutional provisions, while Part IV
details how it may manifest through legislative instruments. Part V briefly
details the promises and perils of structural environmental constitutionalism
and its implications for achieving the goals of environmental constitutionalism
generally—a different set of implications than those presented by fundamental
environmental constitutionalism. Part VI briefly concludes.

Hudson, Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy, 44
CONN. L. REV. 925 (2012) [hereinafter Hudson, Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change]; Blake
Hudson, Federal Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change,
87 IND. L.J. 1455 (2012) [hereinafter Hudson, Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change].
10 See generally Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons
Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. 1007, 1007-08 (2012) [hereinafter Hudson, The Keystone of
Nested Commons Governance]; Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 1291.
11 See generally BLAKE HUDSON, CONSTITUTIONS AND THE COMMONS: THE IMPACT OF
FEDERAL GOVERNANCE ON LOCAL, NATIONAL, AND GLOBAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2014).
12 Hudson, Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 9, at 931-32.
13 Id. at 932-33.
14 Hudson, Climate Change, Forests and Federalism, supra note 9, at 385.
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT: FUNDAMENTAL VERSUS STRUCTURAL
CONSTITUTIONALISM
The most straightforward forms of fundamental or structural
environmental constitutionalism are contained in explicit constitutional text
providing, respectively, citizen rights to a quality environment or allocating
regulatory authority over certain environmental subject matter to particular
levels of government.15 Many national and subnational constitutions already
contain environmental constitutionalism in some form or another.16 Other
participants at this symposium have discussed at length national and
subnational constitutions that contain fundamental environmental
constitutionalism. Yet nations also maintain a wide spectrum of approaches to
structural environmental constitutionalism regarding specific resources.
Consider an example from the forest management sector. Canada’s
constitution explicitly allocates subnational forest management policy authority
to the provinces, with no prescriptive role for the national government.17 In
contrast, Brazil, Russia, and India all maintain national constitutions
containing explicit constitutional text allocating ultimate national and
subnational forest management authority to the national government.18
Though many constitutions already contain explicit fundamental or
structural environmental constitutional provisions, to the extent that
environmental constitutionalism is a growing phenomenon, governments may
attempt to strengthen those forms or otherwise adjust them through
constitutional amendment to achieve more effective or balanced
environmental governance. Both national and state constitutions can be
difficult to amend to incorporate either fundamental or structural
environmental constitutionalism. Yet, just how difficult depends upon, first,
whether the governmental system is federal or unitary, and second, whether it
is the national or the state government that is seeking to amend its
constitution. Once an amendment is passed, the next important question is
whether it will be viable in achieving environmental protection goals. This
question implicates whether the amendment is aimed at fundamental versus
structural constitutionalism. Each of these three binary categories is discussed
in turn below.
A. Federal versus Unitary
Amending national constitutions in unitary systems is typically not as
difficult as doing so in federal systems (at least from a legal perspective) since
only one body politic must coordinate to pass a constitutional amendment in a
See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
See David R. Boyd, The Constitutional Right to a Healthy Environment, ENV’T, July/Aug. 2012,
at 4 (providing a map identifying nations that recognize the right to a healthy environment in
constitutions, legislation, or international agreements).
17 See Hudson, Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change, supra note 9, at 1497.
18 Id. at 1491-92, 1500, 1502.
15
16
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unitary system. In federal systems, however, state or provincial governments
not only have political interests at stake in any national constitutional
amendment, but these subnational governments maintain legally guaranteed
participation in the amendment process. States or provinces, therefore, may
legally thwart efforts to undertake constitutional amendment at the national
level.
In the United States, for example, citizens have made over ten thousand
Only a handful of
attempts to amend the national Constitution.19
amendments have passed, in large part because of the difficulties posed by the
Article V amendment process. Under that process, an amendment must be
proposed by either two-thirds of both houses (the Senate or House of
Representatives) or two-thirds of state governments, and then it must be
ratified by three-quarters of state governments.20
Similarly, the Canadian national constitution has only been amended ten
times since Canada was officially vested with the power to amend its
constitution in 1982.21 Most of these amendments are aimed at provincespecific issues,22 and the citizenry has trended toward using the amendment
process to vest more powers in the provinces rather than the national
government.23 Further, Canada’s amending procedure was not unanimously
agreed upon by the provinces, as Quebec raised questions as to its legitimacy.24
Due to fears of illegitimacy, courts have refused to interpret, or even
acknowledge, certain Canadian amendments.25 Even if considered legitimate,
it is virtually impossible to pass an amendment that binds the provinces
entirely. For some amendments, two-thirds of the provinces must agree,
including at least fifty percent of the population,26 and provinces may opt out
of adopting an amendment that all other provinces agree to merely by passing
a resolution opposing the amendment within one year.27
The amendment processes in these federal systems demonstrate the
difficulty of amending national constitutions when subnational governments
19 RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AMENDING AMERICA: IF WE LOVE THE
CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO WE KEEP TRYING TO CHANGE IT? 169 (1993); see JOHN R.
VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND
AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–1995 363–80 (1996); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On Amending the
Constitution: A Plea for Patience, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 677, 679 (1990).
20 U.S. CONST. art. V.
21 Prior to 1982, the amendment power had been with the British government. Kevin
Sneesby, National Separation: Canada in Context—A Legal Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1357, 1366
(1993).
22 Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.).
23 Jeffrey L. Friesen, The Distribution of Treaty-Implementing Powers in Constitutional Federations:
Thoughts on the American and Canadian Models, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1415, 1439 (1994).
24 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.); Sujit Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking
in Comparative Constitutional Perspective: Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 193, 222 (2008).
25 Choudhry, supra note 24, at 227.
26 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part V, § 38(1)(b) of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.).
27 Id. at § 38(3).
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maintain constitutionally protected legal inputs into the amendment process.
Achieving either fundamental or structural environmental constitutional
changes in these systems, therefore, is fraught with more legal difficulties than
achieving them in unitary systems.
B. National Versus State Constitutions
The operation of state and provincial governments in federal systems
approximates that of national governments in unitary systems and, therefore,
state and provincial governments are more readily capable of achieving
constitutional amendment. States and provinces, of course, have local
governments within their borders (municipalities, counties, and other
subnational units), which in turn maintain legal authority. However, that legal
authority typically arises solely from the state or provincial governments.
In both the U.S. and Canada, for example, local governments do not exist
under national constitutions (as do the states and provinces), but rather they
are created out of state or provincial constitutional authority. In this way, as
with unitary systems, local governments only maintain as much power as the
state or provincial government gives them, which conceivably could be no
legal authority at all. State governments in the United States, for example,
must empower local governments legislatively or constitutionally through the
grant of “home rule” or pursuant to “Dillon’s Rule,” and remain free to
withhold or take back some of that power through preemption.28 State
governments therefore also may operate as one body politic when undertaking
constitutional amendment to incorporate or adjust fundamental or structural
environmental constitutionalism. In this way, achieving either fundamental or
structural environmental constitutionalism through constitutional amendment
is an easier legal task at the state or provincial level than at the national level.
C. Fundamental Versus Structural Constitutionalism
Notwithstanding the uncertain political probability of passing or amending
constitutional provisions related to the environment—at either the national or
state/provincial level—there are many ways in which national or subnational
constitutions could conceivably be amended to affect environmental rights
and regulations and to achieve either fundamental or structural environmental
constitutionalism. The effectiveness of such an amendment in actually
achieving environmental goals may depend in large part on the type of
environmental constitutionalism sought to be achieved. First, consider
fundamental constitutionalism.
J.B. Ruhl has provided a useful analytical tool for assessing the viability of
fundamental environmental constitutional provisions, specifically seeking to
assess the utility of an “environmental quality amendment” (EQA).29 As
Hudson & Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 1308-09.
J.B. Ruhl, The Metrics of Constitutional Amendments: And Why Proposed Environmental Quality
Amendments Don’t Measure Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 248-49 (1999).
28
29

2015]

Structural Environmental Constitutionalism

207

described by Ruhl, EQAs tend to be aspirational, broad, and include language
such as: “[t]he natural resources of the nation are the heritage of present and
future generations. The right of each person to clean and healthful air and
water, and to the protection of other natural resources of the nation, shall not
be infringed by any person.”30 These amendments may be assessed based
upon their function (the institutional purpose of the amendment) and their
target (the societal interaction adjusted by the functional change).31 The
potential functions include whether the amendment: (1) alters the operational
rules of government; (2) prohibits specified government action; (3) creates or
affirms individual rights; or (4) expresses aspirational goals.32 The targets of
the function may be: (1) intra- and intergovernmental relations; (2) relations
between the government and its citizens; or (3) relations between citizens.33
Ruhl determined that EQAs fall into a category not currently represented
within the United States Constitution, since it would be an amendment
establishing aspirational goals (function 4) aimed at citizen-citizen relations
(target 3).34 These types of amendments are just the types that Ruhl argues
should not be included in the United States Constitution35 since they must
necessarily be drafted either ambiguously broad or so narrowly that
implementing them would be nearly impossible.
Applying Ruhl’s matrix, the many state constitutions that contain public
trust or similar provisions36 appear to establish aspirational goals (function 4)
or even create or affirm individual rights (function 3) targeting the relationship
between the government and its citizens (target 2) since the provisions seek to
compel government protection of important resources. If viewed as
establishing aspirational goals (function 4), then these provisions may also lend
themselves to the same criticisms levied by Ruhl against national amendments,
in that they are ambiguous as to what protections must actually occur or what
the remedy will be if protections are not put into place through legislative or
judicial action. Even so, if state provisions are viewed as creating or affirming
citizens’ rights (function 3), by reifying common law concepts like the public
trust doctrine, they can provide support for citizen judicial claims that states
must meet their obligations to protect certain resources.37 The United States
Constitution currently contains three amendments in this category.38 In this
Ruhl, supra note 29, at 248.
Id. at 253.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 252 (“[A]ny EQA attempting to capture a normative statement about the
environment and plug it into the United States Constitution is simply a bad idea.”).
Furthermore, “amendments purporting to express aspirational values or regulate civil relations,
or do both, should set off bells and whistles in the political evaluation process.” Id. at 260.
36 See generally BLUMM & WOOD, supra note 2.
37 See Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901, 954-56 (Pa. 2013); Bonser-Lain v. Texas
Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, No. D-1-GN-11-002194, 2012 WL 3164561, at *1-2 (Tex. Dist. Ct.
Aug. 2, 2012), vacated, 438 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App. 2014).
38 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 261 fig.1 (identifying Amendments Six, Seven, and Ten as creating
or affirming citizens’ rights).
30
31
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way, fundamental constitutionalism providing citizen rights to compel
government action may be more efficacious, especially at the state level, than
those criticized by Ruhl as ineffectual.
While fundamental constitutionalism may lead to constitutional protections
of environmental rights that are of varying degrees of effectiveness, these are
not the only types of constitutional adjustments that can affect environmental
quality. In addition to amendments providing constitutionally protected
individual rights to environmental welfare, other amendments might simply
clarify or adjust regulatory authority over environmental resource management
between levels of government. Citizens may seek federal intervention into a
resource management category dominated by state governments, such as land
use regulation or direct forest management in the United States. Or perhaps
state governments wish to regulate certain subject matters free of federal
preemption. In these scenarios, a constitutional amendment could clarify that
the federal government maintains regulatory authority over certain categories
of resource management in addition to the states. Or, an amendment could
provide that the states will be able to regulate in certain resource management
areas free from undermining federal interference. These types of amendments
would fall into a category far more likely to be viable according to Ruhl’s
matrix.
Take an example in the forest management context, where an amendment
might simply declare: “The federal government of the United States maintains
the authority to regulate, in addition to the states, the management of the
nation’s forest resources; federally-owned, state-owned, and privately-owned.”
This amendment would serve a function of altering the operational rules of
government (function 1) and would adjust the target of intergovernmental
relations (target 1). Nine United States constitutional amendments currently
fall under the “function 1, target 1” category of the matrix.39 In this way, the
federal and state governments in the United States might one day agree to
change the operational rules of government and the current status of
intergovernmental relations by rebalancing federal-state roles in regulating
forest management or other regulatory subject areas where one level of
government is precluded from prescriptively regulating. The same may occur
at the state level, for example, if citizens would prefer more local control over
the location of fracking activities within their states, rather than being
preempted by state law,40 or if states want to prevent local governments from
blocking citizen rights to utilize distributed solar or wind renewables on their
rooftops.41
Such an amendment may emerge as necessary since society may be unable
to achieve some policies in the absence of an amendment.42 In the federal
Ruhl, supra note 29, at 261 fig.1 (identifying Amendments Twelve, Fourteen
(Section Two), Seventeen, Twenty, Twenty-One, Twenty-Two, Twenty-Three,
Twenty-Five, and Twenty-Seven).
40 See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 936.
41 See Troy A. Rule, Renewable Energy and the Neighbors, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 1223, 1242 (2010).
42 Ruhl, supra note 29, at 270–71.
39
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context, though the legislative process may be preferable to constitutional
amendment so that the meaning of the Constitution does not become diluted
and otherwise take the form of a legislative instrument, Ruhl asserts that:
The question of need, therefore, is whether there is any
institutional barrier to fulfilling the fundamental, widely accepted
social policy through routine legislative and judicial forums. . . .
[S]ome amendments have forced an intransigent minority of states
to come into line with the rest of the nation on fundamental social
policy issues associated with matters traditionally (or
constitutionally) left to state jurisdiction. Where federal legislation
cannot impose the policy over state resistance and the courts
cannot mold the existing constitutional text to handle the stubborn
states, an amendment is the only alternative. These are examples
of institutional necessity, where an amendment, and only an
amendment, can allow the widely accepted social policy to move
forward in society.43

There are a number of institutional barriers to regulatory inputs into certain
forms of natural capital regulation at various levels of government—barriers
that arise out of federal and state constitutional and legislative provisions.44 As
one example, the absence of adequate forest management standards in many
states, especially in the southeastern United States, supports the idea that an
amendment remedying exclusive state regulatory authority over subnational
forest policy could be a last resort to overcoming that institutional barrier with a
more effective policy approach.45 Indeed, some scholars have argued for
constitutional amendments that rebalance the relationship between the United
States federal government and the states in the presence of ineffective state
environmental policymaking.46 These types of amendments would be “purely
structural,” unlike a constitutional amendment providing for an individual’s
right to a clean and healthy environment, and would “empower[] Congress to
legislate regarding the environment”47 if it chose to do so. These
amendments, therefore, would not compel particular levels of government to
legislate nor would any new fundamental constitutional rights be created for
citizens. The constitutional authority to regulate would merely be reallocated
between levels of government.
Ruhl, supra note 29, at 271.
See generally Hudson, The Keystone of Nested Commons Governance, supra note 9.
45 See Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643, 1686 (2014).
46 See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy
Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013, 11018 (2004). Professor Craig argues that “a
constitutional amendment could allow Congress to reenact the federal environmental statutes
pursuant to that amendment’s grant of legislative authority, freeing them of any lingering
Commerce Clause limitations and leaving Congress free to reach the last federally unregulated
impediments to environmental quality—such as nonpoint source pollution—currently deemed
to be outside the federal regulatory sphere.” Id. at 11019–20.
47 Dan L. Gildor, Preserving the Priceless: A Constitutional Amendment to Empower Congress to
Preserve, Protect, and Promote The Environment, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 821, 823 (2005).
43
44
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This discussion, of course, is not an assessment of the likelihood of such an
amendment being passed. Even though the type of structural amendment
highlighted above may be the kind most likely to be effective if enacted, it
remains incredibly difficult to convince three-quarters of the states to ratify an
amendment that intrudes on state regulatory powers—and it remains that any
kind of “constitutional environmental amendment is unlikely in the current
political climate,” at least at the federal level.48 For the reasons discussed in
Part II (B), it may be easier to craft such an amendment at the state or
provincial government level or within unitary systems of government, which
might act more readily, for example, to prevent local governments from
barring the use of distributed renewables within their jurisdictions.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Structural environmental constitutionalism is not always embodied
explicitly within constitutional text. The judiciary, at both the state/provincial
and national levels, plays a key role in interpreting both textual environmental
constitutional provisions and explicitly non-environmental provisions of
constitutions that, while not specifically addressing environmental subject
matter, establish authority for such regulation. For instance, the United States
Congress cannot regulate unless it does so pursuant to one of its constitutional
powers, such as the power to tax, make treaties, manage federal property, or to
“regulate Commerce . . . among the several states[.]”49 This last power, the
Commerce Clause, is the provision pursuant to which most federal
environmental legislation is passed. The Endangered Species Act of 1973,50
the Clean Air Act,51 and the Clean Water Act,52 among a number of other
federal statutes, were enacted under Commerce Clause authority.53 A number
of constitutional tests have arisen to determine when Congress is acting
pursuant to this power, including the “substantial effects” test, which asks
whether Congress is regulating an economic activity that in the aggregate has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce (regardless of whether that activity is
clearly interstate or completely intrastate).54 Interpretation of this provision
has proven fertile ground for judicial wrangling over the scope of federal
authority under the Commerce Clause and when federal exercise of that
authority might begin to intrude on powers reserved for the states.55
Craig, supra note 46, at 11018.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
50 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
51 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012).
52 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012).
53 See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675
(2012).
54 Blake Hudson, Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation Under
the Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375, 377-78 (2011).
55 See Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Limiting Raich, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 743, 746-47
(2005); Eric Brignac, The Commerce Clause Justification of Federal Endangered Species Protection: Gibbs
48
49
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In the judicial interpretation context, let us once again revisit our forest
policy example. Forests are not explicitly mentioned in the United States
Constitution, as they are in the Canadian, Brazilian, Russian, and Indian
constitutions.56 As a result, regulatory authority over subnational forest policy
in the United States is up for judicial interpretation. Currently, subnational
governments in the United States maintain sole authority over subnational
forest management because forests fall into the category of land use planning,
long considered a regulatory role for state and local governments.57
Furthermore, the United States federal government has never legislatively
claimed authority over direct subnational forest management, so United States
courts have not had a chance to adjust, through judicial interpretation,
structural environmental constitutionalism related to United States forest
policy.
Contrast the United States with Australia, which also has a constitution that
does not explicitly contemplate forest governance. Australian courts have
declared that all levels of government can maintain regulatory inputs into
forest management at any level and of any type, including the federal

v. Babbitt, 79 N.C. L. REV. 873, 883 (2001); Eric R. Claeys, Raich and Judicial Conservatism at the
Close of the Rehnquist Court, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 791, 816 (2005); Christy H. Dral & Jerry J.
Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of United States v. Lopez and United States v.
Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 621 (2001); Gildor, supra note 47, at 830, 833-35; Christine A.
Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 23-27 (2003); Bradford C.
Mank, Protecting Intrastate Threatened Species: Does the Endangered Species Act Encroach on Traditional
State Authority and Exceed the Outer Limits of the Commerce Clause?, 36 GA. L. REV. 723, 735–44
(2002); Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using a
Hydrological Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 844–46
(2003); Thomas W. Merrill, Rescuing Federalism After Raich: The Case for Clear Statement Rules, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 823, 844 (2005); John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the
Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 191-92 (1998); Sara D. Van Loh, The Latest
and Greatest Commerce Clause Challenges to the Endangered Species Act: Rancho Viejo and GDF Realty,
31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 459, 462-69 (2004); Lori J. Warner, The Potential Impact of United States v.
Lopez on Environmental Regulation, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 321, 321-40 (1997); Omar N.
White, The Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional Analysis Under the Commerce
Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215, 235-39 (2000); Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing
Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival after Gonzales v. Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 2125 (2005).
56 See Hudson, Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change, supra note 9, at 1497, 1500, 1502-03.
57 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 660-61 (1887); PAUL
GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE AND
CONSERVATION 967 (2006); JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 849 (2006);
James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource Protection, in THE EVOLUTION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 (Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates
eds., 2010); JOHN R. NOLON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008); Gerald A. Rose et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in the
U.S., in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER 238, 239 (Carol J.
Pierce Colfer & Doris Capistrano eds., 2005); Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good:
The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335
(2003).
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government so long as it maintains obligations under its “external affairs”
power.58
Even in countries with explicit environmental constitutional text, courts
play a key role in interpreting those provisions. For example, Canadian courts
have trended toward increasing provincial authority in environmental and
other regulatory areas,59 whereas Brazilian courts have trended toward
centralized, national authority.60
State and provincial constitutional powers must be interpreted as well,
whether related to the balance of environmental regulatory authority between
state/provincial and local governments (structural environmental
constitutionalism) or related to citizen environmental rights (fundamental
environmental constitutionalism). A clear example of both structural and
fundamental environmental constitutionalism arises from a case discussed in
depth at this symposium, Robinson Township v. Pennsylvania.61 In Robinson
Township, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a statute preempting
municipalities’ ability to regulate natural gas fracturing (“fracking”) and other
oil and gas operations out of environmental concern violated the
Environmental Rights Amendment of the state constitution.62 While the
amendment in question dealt with fundamental constitutional environmental
protections, the court’s ruling adjusted the structure of regulatory authority
over fracking activities since, as discussed in the next section, it found that the
exercise of legislative preemption under the circumstances violated structural
mandates of the state constitution.63
Despite judicial interpretations in Pennsylvania, as of 2012, over 100
municipalities in the United States had banned fracking activities within their
borders,64 and other states’ efforts to preempt these policies have been upheld
by courts.65 Courts in Louisiana and Ohio, for example, have upheld state
preemption of local government regulation of fracking activities,66
demonstrating the key role the judiciary plays in the implementation of
structural environmental constitutionalism.

Hudson, Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change, supra note 9, at 1484-86.
Id. at 1499.
60 Id. at 1493.
61 Robinson Twp. v. Pennsylvania, 83 A.3d 901 (Pa. 2013).
62 Id. at 985.
63 Id. at 978.
64 Shaun A. Goho, Municipalities and Hydraulic Fracturing: Trends in State Preemption, 64
PLANNING & ENVTL. L. 3, 4, available at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/environmentallawprogram
/files/2013/03/Municipalities-and-Hydraulic-Fracturing-Trends-in-State-Preemption.pdf.
65 Of course, a constitutional provision like the one at issue in Robinson Township could
always be legislatively amended by the state to allow preemption.
66 See Energy Mgmt. Corp v. City of Shreveport, 467 F.3d 471, 483-84 (5th Cir. 2006); State
ex rel. Morrison v. Beck Energy Corp., 989 N.E.2d 85, 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 2013).
58
59
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IV. LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS ARISING OUT OF
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
Structural environmental constitutionalism also manifests in legislative
attempts to supersede the environmental authority of some other branch of
government. This can come in the form of federal regulation preempting state
and local activities or state regulation preempting local governments. For
example, the federal government has preempted the ability of state and local
governments to require more restrictive standards than federal government for
controlling air pollution from mobile sources.67 In Metropolitan Taxicab Board of
Trade v. City of New York, for example, the city of New York attempted to
mandate fuel efficiency standards for its taxi fleet that were higher than federal
standards.68 The court ruled that the regulations that attempted to do so were
preempted by the Clean Air Act and, therefore, were invalid.69
At the state level, Robinson Township provides a prime example. Recall that
the Pennsylvania state government attempted by statute to preempt local
governments’ ability to regulate natural gas fracturing (“fracking”) and other
oil and gas operations.70 Though the legislature was ultimately found to be
unconstitutionally seeking to adjust the structure of environmental
policymaking, other state legislatures have been able to legislatively make such
an adjustment—potentially for the worse.71
Though federal and state preemption occurs through legislative acts,
preempting legislation clearly arises out of constitutional authority. Even so, it
is most directly the legislation rather than the constitution that readjusts the
balance of environmental policymaking inputs across levels of government.
V. THE PROMISES AND PERILS OF STRUCTURAL
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
Structural environmental constitutionalism has yet to be integrated into the
environmental constitutionalism literature, yet there are a number of reasons
why it should be given greater attention.72 First, and stated most simply,
properly balancing the structure of environmental policymaking across scales
of government can create more optimal environmental management, whereas
imbalances can create a variety of harms. The dynamic federalism literature
demonstrates that for structural environmental constitutionalism to be
adequate, policy inputs at local, state/provincial, and federal levels will achieve
67 See Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56
EMORY L.J. 159, 184-87 (2006).
68 Metro. Taxicab Bd. of Trade v. City of New York, 615 F.3d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 2010).
69 Id. at 158.
70 See PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (stating that “Pennsylvania’s public natural resources are the
common property of all of the people . . . .”).
71 See Energy Mgmt. Corp, 467 F.3d at 483; Morrison, 989 N.E.2d at 99.
72
See generally JAMES R. MAY & ERIN DALY, G LOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL
C ONSTITUTIONALISM (2015) (providing an in depth discussion of the types of environmental
constitutionalism).
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better environmental outcomes than siloing off separate regulatory spheres
between levels of government under a dual federalist model.73 Returning once
again to our forest example, the constitutional structure of Australian forest
policy regulatory authority, which as you recall allows inputs at all levels of
government,74 will more readily legally facilitate the type of forest management
policy considered optimal by forest policy analysts.75 The dual federal
structure of United States and Canadian forest policy, on the other hand, can
lead to suboptimal environmental outcomes in the forest sector.76
The second reason that structural environmental constitutionalism should
be given greater attention is that it might have an overall greater practical
impact than fundamental constitutional provisions, at least at present and until
fundamental environmental constitutional provisions are taken more seriously
by more governments. Both structural changes to constitutions and the
establishment of fundamental rights within them can come about through
procedural and political processes. However, as discussed in Part II(C), J.B.
Ruhl’s useful matrix assessing the viability of different environmental
constitutional amendments supports a conclusion that making structural
changes to how government operates may be more efficacious if ultimately
achieved—at least at the federal level.77 In other words, using aspirational
language like that found in the Pennsylvania State Constitution is not likely to
be very effective in a national constitution like the United States Constitution,
since the constitutional authority of subnational governments must still be
contended with and there is a lack of clarity about what these rights mean and
what obligations the government maintains to carry them out. On the other
hand, incorporating a national constitutional provision that declares “the
federal government shall have the authority to directly regulate land use
planning” or a state constitutional provision that declares “state governments
will not interfere with local regulation of oil and gas development activities”
would provide clear constitutional authority where before it may have been
uncertain. Such provisions would further facilitate any political will that exists
to take action at those levels of government, through a minimum standards
approach or otherwise.
Third, and finally, structural environmental constitutionalism may also cure
some of the ills associated with fundamental environmental constitutionalism.
73 See Engel, supra note 67, at 175-76; Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive
Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 246 (2005).
74 Hudson, Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change, supra note 9, at 1484-86.
75 See Doris Capistrano & Carol J. Pierce Colfer, Decentralization: Issues, Lessons and Reflections,
in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE 296, 311-12 (Carol J.
Pierce Colfer & Doris Capistrano eds., 2005); HANS GREGERSEN ET AL., FOREST TRENDS,
FOREST GOVERNANCE IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: AN OVERVIEW OF EXPERIENCES AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR DECENTRALIZATION 8-9, 15 (2004), available at http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/
CONTRERASpublications/pdf_files/interlaken/Interlaken_pre-paper.pdf;
ARNOLDO
HERMOSILLA ET AL., FOREST TRENDS, FOREST GOVERNANCE IN COUNTRIES WITH FEDERAL
SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT: LESSONS FOR DECENTRALIZATION 7 (2008), available at
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/GovBrief/GovBrief0739E.pdf.
76 See generally Hudson, Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 9.
77 See Ruhl, supra note 29, at 11.
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Fundamental environmental constitutional protections may work at the state
level in Pennsylvania, but what about nationally or at the state level in Brazil,
India, and elsewhere? Consider Brazil, which has both fundamental
environmental constitutional provisions and structural provisions related to
certain resources, like forests.78 Brazil’s fundamental protections are largely
disregarded, and “[a]ttempts to embody environmental protection clauses in
national constitutions, such as Brazil’s, do not appear to have appreciably
At some point, if
influenced the prevailing bureaucratic culture.”79
fundamental provisions are in place, but are disregarded for long enough,
there may be an erosion of institutional legitimacy for any future government
seeking to actually implement those provisions. This can devalue the
constitutional text in practice as governments disregard constitutional
provisions or court decisions interpreting them.80 If, however, nations can
make structural adjustments to the allocation of constitutional authority,
empowering, for example, the local populous through restructuring control
over forest resources in a more legally decentralized manner, then perhaps
fundamental environmental constitutional provisions may be taken more
seriously. This, of course, would likely require building capacity at local levels,
increasing enforcement and respect for the rule of law within a nation, among
a number of other governance adjustments. Indeed, these adjustments are
very much needed in nations like Brazil and India.81 Yet, if they can succeed,
then both structural changes and fundamental constitutional provisions can
better protect the environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
By including an analysis of structural environmental constitutionalism into
the current canon of environmental constitutionalism scholarship, we can
identify imbalances in environmental governance authority and how to adjust
those imbalances, facilitate more immediate practical impacts on
environmental governance across scales, and lay a firm foundation for other
forms of environmental constitutionalism, like fundamental. Failing to see
environmental governance authority as also a constitutional matter rather than
merely a political matter can lead to path dependency and the perpetuation of
institutions that negatively impact environmental governance. Too often, a
disproportionate amount of blame is placed on political will for poor
environmental policy—either poor political will leads to a lack of needed
policies at certain levels of government or poor political will leads to
governance institutions incapable of enforcing law on the books. Obviously,
political will is a key component to crafting any policy. Yet political will and
See Hudson, Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change, supra note 9, at 1491-96.
Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmental Law in Postcolonial Societies: Straddling the Local-Global
Institutional Spectrum, 11 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 26 (2000).
80 See generally Brigham Daniels & Blake Hudson, Our Constitutional Commons, 49 GA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015).
81 See Hudson, Role of Forests in Regulating Climate Change, supra note 9, at 1491-96, 1500-01.
78
79
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legal institutions (like constitutions) are intertwined in a “chicken or egg”
relationship. I have often described this problem as legal perception
informing political reality. If we do not recognize the legal reality—that is, a
form of structural environmental constitutionalism that may place
constitutional constraints on the exercise of environmental regulatory
authority at particular levels of government—then governments get a free pass
to continue to politically perceive that they are unable to act on certain
important environmental subject matter.
The study of structural
environmental constitutionalism and adjustment of deficient constitutional
structures will be critical to ensuring that structural deficiencies within
constitutions do not undermine political will when it is present.

